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The impact of competition on academic outcomes is likely to depend on whether parents are informed
about schools' effectiveness or valued added (which may or may not be correlated with absolute measures
of their quality), and on whether this information influences their school choices, thereby affecting
schools' market outcomes.  To explore these issues, this paper considers Chile's SNED program, which
seeks to identify effective schools, selecting them from within "homogeneous groups" of arguably
comparable institutions.  Its results are widely disseminated, and the information it generates is quite
different from that conveyed by a simple test-based ranking of schools (which in Chile, turns out to
largely resemble a ranking based on socioeconomic status).  We rely on a sharp regression discontinuity
to estimate the effect that being identified as a SNED winner has on schools’ enrollment, tuition levels,
and socioeconomic composition.  Through five applications of the program, we find no consistent
evidence that winning a SNED award affects these outcomes.  This suggests that information on school
effectiveness -- at least as it is calculated and delivered by the SNED -- might not much affect school
markets.
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The school choice debate has long recognized that the impact of competition on 
academic outcomes may depend on the extent to which parents are informed about and 
value school quality.  Hanushek (1981) states, for instance, that “if the efficiency of our 
school systems is due to poor incentives for teachers and administrators coupled with 
poor decision-making by consumers, it would be unwise to expect much from programs 
that seek to strengthen ‘market forces’ in the selection of schools.”  Moe (1995) notes 
that school choice critics have therefore argued that “parents—especially low income 
parents—supposedly care about practical concerns, such as how close the school is or 
whether it has a good sports team, and put little emphasis on academic quality and other 
properties of effective schooling.” (emphasis added)
1 
Since these statements were made, the economics literature has produced fairly 
clear evidence that parents do care about school quality as measured by test scores.   
Black (1999) and Figlio and Lucas (2004), for instance, present quasi-experimental 
evidence suggesting that consumers are willing to pay more for houses tied to schools 
with higher mean scores.
2  More recently, Hastings, Van Weelden, and Weinstein (2007) 
present results from a randomization suggesting that even lower income parents’ school 
choices respond to test score data.  This is also consistent with logit and structural 
estimates of parental preferences and demand responses.
3 
A drawback of this evidence, however, is that test scores conflate peer quality and 
school effectiveness or value added—indeed, perhaps the clearest finding in the 
economics of education is that socioeconomic status and academic achievement are 
strongly correlated.  This matters because if parents react to testing data simply because it 
informs them as to which schools contain “better” children, then it is not clear that giving 
them greater choice would be the best way to provide schools with incentives to become 
more effective. Schools might respond, for instance, by seeking better ways to attract 
                                                 
1 An extensive literature indeed raises the possibility that parents are either uninformed about school 
quality, or else select schools using other criteria; there is less consistent evidence that such behavior is 
more prevalent among lower income households.  See for instance Henig (1994), Ascher et al. (1996), 
Armour and Peiser (1998), Kleitz et al. (2000), Lubienski (2003), and Elacqua and Fabrega (2004). 
2 See also Bogart and Cromwell (1997), Brunner et al. (2001), and Downes and Zabel (2002). 
3 See for instance Hastings, Kane, and Staiger (2006), Bayer, Ferreira and McMillan (2007), and Gallego 
and Hernando (2007).  These studies suggest that parents also value school traits like proximity.   2
wealthy parents, rather than by exploring better teaching techniques.  This possibility is 
relevant because other research suggests that parents care about peer quality in itself, and 
that school choice can facilitate stratification.
4  
Thus a gap in the literature relates to whether parental choices, and thereby schools’ 
market outcomes, would respond to signals of school effectiveness per se, even if these 
were not necessarily correlated with peer quality.  This paper attempts to address this gap.  
To do so, we consider how Chilean schools’ (enrollment) market shares, their tuition, and 
their student composition react when they are identified as performing well relative to 
schools that serve similar children.  Specifically, we analyze the SNED,
5 a program 
which relies mainly on schools’ test score levels and inter-cohort gains to select good 
performers from within more than one hundred “homogeneous groups” constructed such 
that they contain institutions used by arguably comparable children.  
While isolating school effectiveness is ultimately very difficult, the SNED thus 
aims to approximate it in a simple manner which shares elements with approaches used 
elsewhere, including New Jersey, New York City, and North Carolina.  Its results are 
disseminated via newspaper publications, the internet, PTA meetings, and in some 
municipalities, by placing banners close to school entry-ways.
6 
This setting is interesting for several reasons.  First, the information the SNED 
generates is indeed quite different from that conveyed by a simple test-based ranking of 
schools.  This is important because as Mizala et al. (2007) point out, in Chile such a 
ranking turns out to be close to one based on schools’ average socioeconomic status.   
Second, within each homogeneous group, the SNED selects “winners” after ranking 
schools based on an index.  The top-ranked schools are chosen such that winners account 
for about 25 percent of enrollments, resulting in clear group-specific cutoff scores.   
Parents are informed of schools’ status (winner or non-winner), but not of their index 
values.  These facts allow us to use a regression discontinuity design to evaluate the 
                                                 
4 See for instance Henig (1990), Epple and Romano (1998), Schneider and Buckley (2002), Bayer and 
McMillan (2005), Urquiola (2005), Hsieh and Urquiola (2006), Rothstein (2006), Card, Mas, and Rothstein 
(2007), and Gallego and Hernando (2007). 
5 Sistema Nacional de Evaluación del Desempeño de los Establecimientos Educativos Subvencionados.   
6 New Jersey uses school report cards allowing parents to match schools to district factor groups made up 
of institutions in districts of similar socioeconomic status.  New York City places schools in “peer 
horizons” containing about 40 similar institutions.  North Carolina’s ABCs accountability model also uses 
test scores changes and relies on the placement of banners to identify award-winning schools.   3
effects of selection among arguably similar schools.  Further, the SNED has distributed 
awards six times since 1996, providing reasonable sample sizes. 
Third, along several dimensions, Chile has the most liberalized school market in the 
world, one which might actually give parents the ability to react to data on school 
effectiveness.  In urban areas, more than half of all schools are private, and most of these 
are run for-profit.  About 90 percent of all schools, religious and secular, are voucher-
funded, and about half of the private ones charge tuition in addition to the voucher.   
We study the effect that being identified as a SNED winner has on a number of 
schools’ outcomes.  First, we consider their 1
st and 9
th grade enrollments, as well as the 
number of classes they operate at these levels.  We focus on these grades because they 
are the entry points into most schools, and thus perhaps more sensitive to changing 
demand.  Second, we study the probability that schools charge tuition, and the amount 
they charge.  This reflects that schools might respond to increased demand not by 
expanding but by raising their prices, a possibility we investigate in part because we do 
not have measures of excess demand.  Third, we consider schools’ socioeconomic 
composition measured using a vulnerability index, household income, and parental 
schooling.  This reflects that schools could leverage the awards and increased demand by 
becoming more selective.   
The key finding is that through five rounds of the program, there is no consistent 
evidence that SNED awards affect any of these outcomes.  Our point estimates are often 
close to zero, although for some outcomes they are sometimes consistent with non-trivial 
effects.  Nevertheless, the lack of evidence of a positive impact holds despite data from 
multiple allocations and through three robustness checks.   
First, we address the possibility that the SNED’s (more than one hundred) 
homogeneous groups might not identify sets of schools that are effectively in competition 
with each other.  To do so, we consider sets of schools that in addition to belonging to the 
same group, operate in the same municipality.  This results in smaller comparison groups, 
since there are 341 municipalities in Chile, and in urban areas they often identify compact 
and homogeneous neighborhoods.  Second, to explore the possibility that more educated 
parents are more sensitive to data on school quality, we restrict attention to homogeneous 
groups of higher socioeconomic status.  Third, we restrict attention to the two most recent   4
SNED rounds, addressing the possibility that parents need time to understand such 
schemes, and the fact that the dissemination of SNED results has increased over time. 
In short, our results suggest that information on school effectiveness—at least as it 
is delivered by the SNED—does not seem to substantially affect schools’ market 
outcomes.  This finding is consistent with several possibilities.  First, while parents might 
value effectiveness, information on it might ultimately not affect school selections based 
on characteristics like proximity or peer quality.  Second, the SNED might not have 
sufficiently registered with parents, despite its decade-long existence.  Third, the scheme 
might not produce “news” if parents are able to deduce its essential results on their own.  
Such sophisticated parents, further, might discount noisier inputs into the index.       
Whichever is the case, our findings suggest caution in reaching conclusions on the impact 
of information related to school effectiveness.   
By way of closing this introduction, we note that the SNED was designed in part as 
a teacher incentive scheme—in addition to being identified as effective, winning schools’ 
teachers are paid an annual bonus equal to about half a monthly salary.  Previous work on 
the SNED has focused on evaluating the impact of these bonuses on testing achievement.  
We do not attempt such an analysis here, mainly because our regression discontinuity 
approach is likely not suited to this purpose, as the existence of the bonus could affect 
behavior at schools that end up on either side of the cutoffs that determine selection.  We 
note, however, that to the extent that these bonus payments render winning schools more 
desirable, they provide further reasons to expect positive effects of the awards on their 
market outcomes, making our failure to find these all the more surprising. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows.  Section II provides background on 
Chile’s school system, and Section III discusses the SNED.  Section IV presents the 
identification strategy, Section V reviews results, and Section VI concludes. 
 
II. Chile’s school system 
 
In 1981, Chile introduced school finance reforms creating one of the most 
liberalized school markets in the world.  Three types of schools operate in Chile:   5
1)  Public or municipal schools are run by 341 municipalities or communes,
7 which 
receive a per-student subsidy from the central government.  These schools cannot turn 
away students unless oversubscribed, and are the suppliers of last resort. 
2)  Private subsidized or voucher schools are independent religious or secular institutions 
that receive the same per student subsidy as public schools.  Unlike the latter, they 
have wide latitude regarding student selection. 
3)  Private unsubsidized schools are also independent, but receive no public funding. 
In 2003, private institutions accounted for about 45 percent of all schools, and 
voucher schools alone for about 36 percent.  In urban areas, these shares were 62 and 48 
percent, respectively.  All private schools can be explicitly for-profit, and Elacqua (2005) 
calculates that about 70 percent of them are indeed operated as such.  Some are run by 
privately or publicly-held corporations that control chains of schools, but the modal one 
seems to be owned and managed by a principal/entrepreneur.  There are few legal 
barriers to entry,
8 and while we have no estimate on the frequency of transactions, it is 
not rare to see classified ads offering private schools for sale.     
While initially subsidized schools were not allowed to charge tuition to supplement 
the voucher subsidy, this restriction was eased in 1994.  At present about 50 percent of 
private voucher schools charge tuition, and back of the envelope calculations suggest that 
they raise resources equal to about 20 percent of their State funding.  Public schools are 
allowed to charge fees only at the secondary level, although in practice few of them do. 
 
III. The SNED 
 
As the government liberalized the educational sector, it began exploring 
mechanisms to provide information that might aid parental school choice.  In 1988 the 
SIMCE
9 testing system came into existence, and as of the mid-1990s its results had been 
widely disseminated, partially through listings of schools’ performance in newspapers.
10  
The government also began using SIMCE results to allocate resources.  For instance, in 
                                                 
7 Municipalities in Chile are generally called communes, and we henceforth use this terminology. 
8 Hsieh and Urquiola (2006), for instance, indicate that roughly one thousand private schools entered the 
market in the decade following the introduction of voucher financing. 
9 Sistema Nacional de Medición de la Calidad de la Educación.   
10 A previous testing system, the Programa de Evaluación del Rendimiento Escolar, was discontinued.   6
1990, it started using 4
th grade scores to assign aid to under-performing schools (Chay et 
al., 2005). 
 
A. The SNED:  Basic details 
 
In the 1990s, the government also began to consider using test scores to promote 
accountability and transmit incentives.  This resulted in the introduction of the SNED,
 a 
system which seeks to identify outstanding public or subsidized private schools, and 
which distributed awards in 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, and 2006. 
In an initial step, the SNED assigns schools to “homogeneous groups” constructed 
in two stages.  First, schools are placed into groups based on three characteristics:  i) 
which of Chile’s thirteen administrative regions they operate in, ii) whether they are in 
the rural or urban area, and iii) the type of schooling they offer (primary only, secondary 
and primary, or special needs).  In a second stage, each group is further subdivided using 
a cluster analysis methodology that groups schools according to the socioeconomic status 
of their students.  This relies on data on parental schooling, household income, and a 
government-calculated vulnerability index.
11  
Table 1 (Column 1, Panel A) shows that in 1998, for example, this resulted in 
schools being assigned to 114 homogeneous groups containing an average of 80 
institutions.  Among primary schools, these groups accounted for 57 and 72 percent of 
the variation in income and mothers’ schooling, respectively.  The total number of groups 
has remained roughly stable since then; the first SNED round, 1996, used a different 
methodology that resulted in only 8 groups, and this is one reason we ignore it below.
12   
The second step in the implementation of the SNED is the calculation of the six 
sub-indices detailed in Table 2.  These are aggregated to a single SNED index with a 
weighting scheme that gives the greatest importance to testing performance.  Specifically, 
schools’ test score levels and their inter-cohort changes receive weights of 37 and 28 
percent, respectively.  Retention and promotion rates also enter into the calculation, as do 
                                                 
11 This measure (the JUNAEB index) is calculated at the school level to target school lunch-type subsidies. 
12 The main reason for the smaller number of groups is that in 1996 these were constructed on a national 
rather than regional basis.  Additionally, in other parts of the methodology (discussed below) the 1996 
round relied on different data.  For instance, it did not use 4
th grade test scores, repetition, or drop out rates.   7
data from surveys that seek to measure parental involvement and working conditions.  
Figure 1 (Panel A) plots smoothed values of the relationship between the SNED index—
and each of its six sub-indices—and schools’ average mothers’ schooling.  As visually 
clear, it is largely the test score level component (the top segment) which induces a 
positive relationship between the overall index and socioeconomic status (SES).
13   
In a third step, the schools within each homogeneous group are ordered according 
to their aggregate index, and those above a given cutoff are given awards.  Each group’s 
cutoff is set such that winning schools account for about 25 percent of total enrollments.
14 
 
B. SNED:  The treatment 
 
For the two years the award is in force, SNED-winning schools are subject to two 
treatments.  First, teachers in selected schools are paid an annual bonus that presently 
averages about 1,000 dollars.
15  Second, winning schools are publicly identified as 
performing well relatively to an arguably meaningful comparison group.  Importantly, 
only information on schools award status, and not on their index values, is made public.
16 
There are several ways in which the list of winners is publicized.  Since the SNED’s 
inception, it has been announced (by the Minister of Education) in a press conference, 
and then published in a national newspaper the following day.  Administrators at winning 
schools, particularly at profit or prestige-maximizing institutions, might be expected to 
inform parents, with subsequent word-of-mouth dissemination.   
Table 3 summarizes the results from a Ministry of Education survey in which 
schools were asked whether they apprise parents regarding their performance in the 
                                                 
13 In linear specifications, only the sub-index that measures test score levels, and the overall SNED index, 
are significantly related to mothers’ schooling or household income.  
14 In the last SNED round, 2006, this was expanded to 35 percent of schools, an issue we return to below.     
15 The real value of this payment has increased over time.  In 1996 it was about 470 dollars, but climbed to 
565 and 1,070 dollars by 2000 and 2006, respectively.  These figures are averages.  In practice, a global 
allocation is made to each school, and 90 percent of it is distributed according to hours worked.  The 
administration has discretion over how the remainder is split; in practice most schools seem to distribute it 
evenly among instructors.  Additionally, as noted, in 2006 the SNED was expanded such that schools 
accounting for 35 rather than 25 percent of enrollments receive the award—schools accounting for the first 
25 percent receive a full bonus, while the rest receive only 60 percent of the full amount.  Below, we ignore 
this issue, treating all schools as if they received the full bonus.  We do so because parents only find out 
whether schools receive an award or not.  Additionally, the distinction does not affect our key results. 
16 With significant effort motivated parents could get a sense of 65 percent of the index, since test score 
levels (and implicitly, changes) are public (but not in the normalized form eventually used in the SNED).   8
SNED and the SIMCE tests more generally.  Although one must keep in mind these data 
are self-reported in an environment in which administrators are encouraged to make 
information available, they suggest that by 2003 between 80 and 90 percent of schools 
engaged in dissemination by way of informing their parents’ association, sending notes 
home, or raising the issue during PTA-type meetings. 
Second, since 2002 (i.e., for the last three rounds) a Ministry of Education website 
has allowed parents to determine multiple schools’ SNED status.  Figure 2 shows an 
image of this site, which after parents select a given commune, returns a listing of all the 
schools within it, and indicates whether they won an award. 
Third, since 2004 (for the two most recent rounds), some communes have 
intervened in the process by helping winning schools to advertise their status in a uniform 
way.  For instance, Figures 3a and 3b present pictures of schools in the communes of 
Santiago and Providencia, respectively.
17  These pictures display standardized banners 
that these municipalities posted at winning schools during the 2006-2007 round.  The 
images show close-ups of the banners and illustrate their placement in visible places. 
Further, information regarding the SNED is not released into a vacuum, since the 
1990s afforded the public with exposure to school performance data.  Figure 4 illustrates 
this by showing the front page of a newspaper announcing the edition contains the scores 
of all schools in a given region.  Further, Figure 5 contains the headline and initial text of 
a story on the SNED itself, including a synopsis of its methodology.   
We underline that to the extent that the SNED seeks to control for SES, the 
information it generates is quite different from that which simple test scores transmit.  
For instance, Mizala et al. (2007) show that about 80 percent of the variation in school-
level test scores in Chile can be explained by parental schooling and household income, 
which implies that rankings based on testing performance largely reflect socioeconomic 
status.  For instance, two programs that chose the top fifth of schools based on their mean 
language score and their average mothers’ schooling would agree on the selection or non-
selection of about 85 percent of all schools.  By design, the SNED produces qualitatively 
different information, since it selects schools from both “rich” and “poor” homogeneous 
                                                 
17 By population, Santiago is the largest commune in Chile.  Both Santiago and Providencia are in the 
Santiago metropolitan area, which contains about 50 communes.   9
groups.  For a simple exercise, compare the 2002 SNED allocation with an award given 
for having language scores in the top quartile in the same year.  63 percent of schools 
would receive neither, and 8 percent both; 29 percent would receive one but not the other. 
Further, each SNED round in some sense produces new information.  Among about 
8,300 schools in the five rounds we focus on, 50 percent of schools either never or always 
received an award (48 and 2 percent, respectively).  22 percent were selected once, and 
15, 10, and 4 percent won awards 2, 3, and 4 times, respectively.
18  
Finally, it is important to be clear that the SNED only seeks to approximate school 
effectiveness.  One way to isolate schools’ value added would be to run a large number of 
randomized experiments, something which is all but impossible for most educational 
systems to do once, let alone on a sustained basis.  The bottom line is that while one 
could envision better ways of generating data on effectiveness, the SNED represents a 
reasonable and feasible approach (as mentioned, New Jersey, New York City, and North 
Carolina generate and use information in broadly similar ways).   
We nevertheless mention, purely as a descriptive result, that winning an award is 
positively and significantly correlated with subsequent performance even controlling for 
observable characteristics.  For instance, Column 1 in Table 4 shows that primary schools 
that received an award in 2002 had higher math scores in 2004, even after controlling for 
mothers’ schooling and household income (Column 2), and for homogenous group 
dummies and testing performance in the previous two years for which scores are 
available (columns 3 and 4).
19  Columns 5-8 suggest a similar conclusion for secondary schools. 
 
                                                 
18 The following table shows the distribution of schools according to the number of awards received.   
Total number of awards  All six rounds  Five rounds considered below 
0 48.0  48.0 
1 22.7  21.8 
2 13.6  14.9 
3 8.2  8.7 
4 4.4  4.5 
5 2.3  2.1 
6 0.8  -- 
Total 100.0  100.0 
 
19 We postpone a discussion of the data to Section IV.B.   10
IV. Empirical strategy 
 
The manner in which the SNED is assigned makes feasible a regression 
discontinuity (henceforth, RD) design.  Figure 6 illustrates this among urban and 
primary-level homogeneous groups.  Panel A describes the allocation for 12,496 
school/year observations that combine data from the 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, and 2006 
SNED waves.  It plots SNED index-cell means of a dummy indicating whether schools 
obtained an award, where the index is measured relative to the cutoff in each school’s 
homogeneous group.  We normalize each group’s cutoff to zero so that we can combine 
data across groups and years.  Additionally, for visual clarity index values are in 0.1 point 
bins (Imbens and Lemieux, 2007).  Panel A makes clear that the probability of selection 
jumps discretely at the cutoff scores—the small amount of (barely visible) 
noncompliance is due to the first round, 1998 (we present regression evidence below).   
This discontinuous relationship can be used to investigate the effect of the SNED on 
schools’ market outcomes.  Following van der Klaauw (2002) one could implement: 
 
                                            yigt=β E(SNEDigt|indexigt)+f(indexigt)+εigt                                            (1)                               
                  E(SNEDigt|indexigt)= γ 1{indexigt ≥cutoffgt}+g(indexigt)+ξ igt                         (2)     
 
where y is an outcome of interest, i indexes schools, g orders homogeneous groups, and t 
stands for different SNED rounds.  E(SNEDigt|indexigt) is the probability of receiving an 
award conditional on having a given index value, f and g are flexible functions of the 
index, and 1{indexigt ≥cutoffgt} is a dummy that takes on a value of one if a school’s index 
is greater than or equal to the cutoff in its respective homogenous group.  If f and g are 
continuous at cutoffgt and E(SNEDigt|indexigt) is discontinuous (Figure 6), then β is non-
parametrically identified at that point.  Intuitively, under the mentioned continuity 
assumptions, other factors affecting y will be similar for schools just above and below the 
cutoff, and their comparison will mimic a randomized design.  Discrete differences in 
outcomes at the cutoff can then be attributed to the award itself.  
Below we assume we have a sharp rather than a fuzzy design, and instead of 
implementing (1)-(2), use a reduced form approach:   11
 
yigt=b 1{indexigt ≥cutoffgt} +h(indexigt)+eigt                                                    (3) 
 
We do this in view of the fact that in our data, satisfying 1{Indexigt ≥Cutoffgt} and actually 
receiving an award are almost equivalent—in all but the first SNED round we use, the 
correspondence is indeed perfect.  Additionally, we specify h as a quadratic in the index, 
and also estimate (3) within arbitrarily narrow bands close to the cutoff scores.  
 
A. What can an RD design identify in this context? 
   
While Figure 6 (Panel A) shows that the SNED produces a “clean” RD, it is 
relevant to ask what this can identify in our context.  As detailed in Section III, the SNED 
treatment has two components:  teachers in winning schools receive bonuses, and these 
schools are identified as performing well relative to a specific reference group. 
Previous work on the SNED has analyzed the effects of the bonuses on testing 
achievement (Contreras, Flores, and Lobato, 2003).  We do not attempt this because our 
sense is that the RD approach is not suited to it, since the SNED’s existence might affect 
the behavior of teachers who know their school is within range of winning, regardless of 
whether this eventually happens or not.  In this case, the intensity of the incentives would 
not vary discretely at the cutoff, even though the bonus payment of course would. 
We focus instead on the effect of the awards on schools’ market outcomes.   
Schools’ award status of course does vary discretely at the cutoff (particularly since as 
stated, index values are not publicized).  As stated, to the extent that bonus payments 
render winning schools more desirable, they provide a further reason to expect positive 
estimates from reduced form approaches like (3). 
 
B. Outcomes, hypotheses, and data 
 
We explore how SNED selection affects the following school level outcomes: 
1)  1
st and 9
th grade enrollments.  To the extent that selected schools experience higher 
demand, they might end up with greater enrollment shares.  We focus on these grades   12
because they are the entry points into most schools, and school choice might therefore 
be least constrained at these junctures.
20   
2)  Number of 1
st and 9
th grade classes operated.  Urquiola and Verhoogen (2006) 
suggest that profit-maximizing Chilean schools view the choice of the number of 
classrooms to operate as a serious one, if only because it influences their fixed costs.  
Additionally, they present evidence suggesting that higher quality schools experience 
higher demand and operate more classrooms.  One might expect, therefore, that 
SNED winners would be more likely to open an additional classroom.  For this and 
the previous outcome, we rely on annual 1997-2007 administrative data collected at 
the beginning of each academic year (around February). 
3)  Tuition.  Since 1994, private voucher schools have been allowed to charge tuition 
add-ons, and at present about 50 percent of them do.  Using 1997-2006 administrative 
data, we study whether schools charge tuition at all, as well as the average amount 
they charge.  We consider the former for two reasons.  First, simply charging tuition 
is a signal of perceived quality in Chile, as parents can always use municipal schools 
for no charge.  Second our tuition data are not grade-specific, and may therefore only 
slowly reflect SNED–induced increases that might first affect lower grades.  In 
contrast, it is easier to observe if a SNED award induces a school that did not charge 
tuition to begin doing so.   
4)  Socioeconomic composition.  Finally, we explore whether winning an award affects 
schools’ socioeconomic composition, something one might expect if a perception of 
higher quality allowed schools to attract a “better” clientele.  For this we rely on two 
types of data.  The first is a government-calculated school-level vulnerability index 
that considers variables like parental schooling and employment, for which we have 
annual 1
st and 9
th grade (1997-2007) observations.
21  For more direct measures, we 
also use data from the SIMCE system, which at times of testing sends a questionnaire 
to students’ homes.  This provides information on household income and parental 
                                                 
20 We explored results for the 7
th grade, as some secondary schools begin operations at this grade.  We omit 
them because they produce conclusions similar to those for the 9
th grade, while providing smaller samples. 
21 The index is calculated by JUNAEB, an agency which uses it to target school-lunch type subsidies.  The 
variables it uses are:  a) the percentage of mothers with less than eight years of schooling, b) the percentage 
of household heads with less than eight years of schooling, c) the employment category of the household 
head, d) the percentage of children who receive welfare payments, e) the percentage of children without 
access to adequate sewerage systems, and f) the percentage of students in households classified as poor.   13




th grades, and each grade is tested (about) only every third year.  We 
discuss further adjustments this necessitates in the results section below.   
 
C. Comparison groups  
 
The most natural way to implement an RD design in our setting is to compare—
within homogeneous groups—the outcomes of schools that just qualify for an award with 
those of schools that just miss receiving one.  Such are the main results we review below. 
To further the probability that we analyze sets of schools effectively in competition with 
each other, we present other results in which we apply the strategy not within 
homogeneous groups, but rather among schools that in addition to being in the same 
group, are located in the same commune.  This is feasible because communes are subsets 
of regions (the basic geographical unit used in the construction of the homogeneous 
groups), and is useful because they come closer to identifying areas where school choice 
might take place.  For instance, the metropolitan area of Santiago, the largest in Chile, 
has about 50 communes, and although children can in principle attend school in any of 
these, in practice many stay in their commune of residence.
22  
Figure 7 illustrates the spirit of this analysis by showing a hypothetical 
homogeneous group that includes schools in three communes, labeled A-C.  The cutoff 
score—a single one for the whole group—separates schools that get an award from those 
that do not.  We use the schools in each of these communes as a commune/homogeneous 
group—i.e. Figure 7 would yield three rather than one quasi-experiment.  Table 1 shows 
the impact this has on the number of groups considered.  Column 1 (Panel A) shows that 
while for 1998 there were a total of 114 homogenous groups, the combination with 
roughly 314 communes results in 1,784 commune/homogenous groups.
23  As Figure 7 
suggests, the latter continue to produce a “clean” first stage (Figure 6, Panel B). 
                                                 
22 The 2002 SIMCE data suggest that about 89 percent of 4
th graders using subsidized institutions go to 
school in the commune in which they live.  In Metropolitan Santiago, this figure goes down to 79 percent.  
As elsewhere, it is also more common for children in secondary school to travel further to school, and they 
therefore cross commune lines more frequently.     
23 To include a commune/homogeneous group, we require that it contain both winning and losing schools.    14
From the point of view of an RD design, this exercise involves a tradeoff.  On the 
one hand, communes facilitate sorting, and so produce even more homogeneous sets of 
comparison schools.  For instance, in 2002 a full set of homogeneous group dummies 
accounted for 57 percent of the variation in income at the 4
th grade level, and 72 percent 
of the variation in average mothers’ schooling.  Using commune/homogeneous group 
dummies, these numbers increase to 68 and 81 percent, respectively.  The intuition is also 
illustrated in Figure 7, where we have arbitrarily drawn commune A to be the one with 
the highest average performance within the homogeneous group, followed by B and C. 
On the other hand, moving to commune/homogeneous groups comes at the cost of 
making comparison groups smaller.  For example, while in the urban area primary 
homogeneous groups contain an average of about 71 schools, commune/homogeneous 
groups have an average of 7 (Table 1), such that the density of observations close to the 
cutoffs can go down significantly (also illustrated in the hypothetical case of Figure 7).   
 
D. Samples and analyses windows 
 
Two final issues define the samples analyzed below.  First, we restrict attention to 
urban comparison groups, since urban parents enjoy greater school choice and therefore 
more opportunities to leverage information on school quality.  Second, there is the issue 
of what chronological windows to analyze.   
We consider two alternatives.  First, we use what we label a “2-year sample” (Table 
1, Panel B) designed to study award effects in two year windows, the most natural 
timeframe to the extent that the SNED waves are two years apart.  In this sample, we 
include schools with valid indices in each round we consider (1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, 
and 2006), and for which there are at least enrollment outcomes one year prior to each 
allocation (to check for continuity), as well as two years after.  To include the 2006 
round, we use the 2007 outcomes as if they were for 2008.  We could have omitted this 
last round, but opted to retain it so that we can consider the longest possible timeframe 
and largest possible samples.  This issue arises only for enrollment and vulnerability, for 
which we have 2007 data (collected early in the academic year).  For all other outcomes, 
we only have data up to 2006.  For the sake of larger samples, we also combine   15
observations from different rounds (clustering standard errors at the school level), and the 
resulting “stacked” data are described in Column 6 (Table 1, Panel B).  Using such data 
implies that in looking at outcomes two years after each round, for instance, we are 
asking if schools that received an award in 1998 had higher enrollments in 2000; whether 
those that received one in 2000 had higher enrollments in 2002, and so on.
24 
  Additionally, Panel C (Table 1) describes a “4-year” sample which allows us to 
explore effects four years after the 1998, 2000, 2002, and 2004 rounds.
25  This is useful in 
looking at outcomes that might be slower to change, but raises a caveat because in 
general the fact that a school wins an award one year increases the probability that it will 
do so again.
26  This means that while schools that just make and just miss an award may 
be comparable at baseline (as shown below), four years later some of the former will 
have received two awards, while the latter will have at most one.  This is likely to bias 




We first present results for primary-level homogeneous groups, then consider 
primary commune/homogeneous groups, and finally turn to the secondary level. 
 
A. First stage  
 
Table 5 presents the first stage results when we analyze the program’s allocation 
among homogeneous groups.  Panel A focuses on the 2-year sample (defined in section 
IV.D), and Column 1 shows that among the 12,496 school/year observations it contains, 
having a baseline index greater than or equal to zero—the normalized cutoff score in 
schools’ respective groups—raises the probability of receiving an award by about one.  
Not surprisingly (in light of Figure 6), the R
2 in this regression is close to one.   
                                                 
24 We also carried out our analyses considering outcomes measured one rather than two years after each 
allocation.  We omit these to save space, as they produce similar results. 
25 Again, using the last of these requires assuming the 2007 outcomes are actually for 2008. 
26 This is despite the fact that some of the SNED sub-indices are measured with some noise, e.g., the inter-
cohort changes—see Kane and Staiger (2002), Chay et al. (2005), and Mizala et al. (2007).   16
While the first stage results are stable in the remaining columns, we nonetheless 
discuss them because these describe the specifications and samples used in the tables 
below.  First, Column 2 includes a quadratic in schools’ baseline index as a control, and 
Column 3 restricts the sample to schools with indices within 0.50 points of their cutoffs, 
reducing the sample by about half.
27  The remaining columns further restrict the sample 
in two ways.  First, to study the possibility that more educated households are more 
responsive to data on school quality, column 4 considers only schools in higher 
socioeconomic status homogeneous groups.
28  Second, column 5 only uses data from the 
last two (2004 and 2006) SNED waves.  This investigates the possibility that parents 
might need an adjustment period to understand and utilize the information the SNED 
delivers, and takes into account the fact that the intensity of dissemination has increased 
over time.  The fit is strong throughout, and the R
2 reaches one in the final column.  This 
reflects that the small amount of “slippage” in the allocation took place in 1998.  Panel B 
describes analogous results for the 4-year sample (Section IV.D), which requires 
excluding the 2006 wave, thereby reducing the sample from 12,496 to 9,659 schools.  
The first stage fit remains strong across all specifications.
  
Finally, still considering the 4-year sample, Panel C explores whether the 
probability of winning additional awards varies discretely at the cutoffs.  Column 1 
shows that schools with a baseline index greater than or equal to zero are 35 percent more 
likely to win another award two years later.
29  Adding a quadratic in the index (Column 
2) reduces the estimate by about half, but it is still significant there and in columns 3 and 
5 (not in the higher socioeconomic status sample, Column 4).  Significance is of course 
consistent with some persistence in SNED awards, which as stated, should bias our 




                                                 
27 We experimented with narrower bands, and with requiring that schools be one of, for example, four of 
the institutions closest to the cutoff.  These exercises produced qualitatively similar conclusions. 
28 That is, we use only homogeneous groups which the SNED methodology itself catalogued as higher SES. 
29 This is to be expected in only given that schools’ test score levels (an input into the aggregate index) are 
correlated with their socioeconomic composition, which is likely to remain fairly stable over time.   17
Turning to the results for enrollment, we first implement a “continuity check” by 
studying whether enrollment prior to the allocation was greater among schools that 
obtained an award.  Such a difference, if it existed close to the cutoffs, would question an 
RD approach.  Figure 8a (Panel A) first presents the graphical evidence for the 2-year 
sample.  It plots index cell means of schools’ 1
st grade enrollment one year before the 
baseline allocations, along with the fitted values of locally weighted regressions 
estimated separately for institutions with negative and non-negative index values.  The 
figure shows an overall positive association between enrollment and schools’ relative 
index, illustrating that even within homogeneous groups, schools that received an award 
tended to be larger prior to doing so.  Table 6 (Panel A) illustrates this in regression form, 
showing this difference was equal to about eight 1
st grade students, equivalent to about 20 
percent of a standard deviation.
30  Columns 2-6 show, however, that this difference falls 
to less than one student and ceases to be significant when we use a quadratic of the 
SNED index as a control, or when we focus on more restricted samples.  Graphically, this 
is reflected in that there is no visible break at the cutoff in Figure 8a, Panel A.  In short, 
as required by the RD design, enrollment prior to each allocation appears to be smoothly 
related to the index in the vicinity of the cutoffs.
31 
  Panel B (Table 6) considers enrollment two years after awards are made.  While 
there is again a substantial difference in the simplest specification (Column 1), this 
becomes small and insignificant in columns 2 and 3; in the latter (which controls for the 
index and restricts the sample to schools closer to the cutoff scores), the point estimate 
suggests that on average, schools that just received an award had about one less 1
st grader 
two years after doing so (relative to institutions that just missed an award).  Column 4 
replicates the sample from column 3, but controls for enrollment one year prior to the 
awards.
32  The point estimate is now -0.2, and we can rule out differences greater than 
about 1.5 students.  Columns 5 and 6 (higher SES groups and recent rounds) suggest 
similar conclusions, although with somewhat smaller samples and higher standard errors.  
                                                 
30 As stated, we selected the samples such that they would include schools with valid enrollment 
information in all relevant years.  This is why the 12,496 observations in Table 5 match those for the 1
st 
stage, in Table 4.  For other outcomes, the sample sizes are generally slightly smaller due to missing data. 
31 We also note that the density of observed SNED index levels (Figure 1, Panel B) does not suggest that 
schools or administrators in any way manipulate the running variable (see McCrary, forthcoming).  
32 We could also compare changes, implicitly restricting the coefficient on prior enrollment to be one; we 
opt instead for the more flexible specification in column 4.   18
Thus, the regressions provide no evidence that SNED awards led schools to 
experience greater enrollment growth.  This is also illustrated in Figure 8a (Panel B), 
which plots the fitted values from Panel A (one year prior to the awards) and adds a 
similar plot using data from two years after.  The plots shifted down over three year 
spans, which could reflect declining cohort sizes or changes in data collection procedures.  
There is no evidence, however, of a change in the relationship close the cutoffs.  Finally, 
panels C and D in Table 6 present analogous regression evidence for the 4-year sample 
with similar results, despite the fact that we expect these estimates to be biased upward. 
 
B. Number of classes in operation 
  
We now ask whether award winners were more likely to open additional 
classrooms.  To some extent this is a robustness check, since given the absence of 
evidence of changes in enrollment, increases in the number of classes would correspond 
to costly class size reductions.  Panels C and D in Figure 8 present the graphical 
evidence, which not surprisingly is quite similar to that for enrollment in panels A and B. 
The regression results are in Table 7.  Beginning with a continuity check using data 
one year prior to each allocation, Column 1 (panels A and C for the 2- and 4-year 
samples, respectively) shows that even among homogeneous groups schools that 
eventually received an award operated 0.11 more 1
st grades, equivalent to a tenth of a 
standard deviation.  In both samples, the differences become smaller and insignificant as 
we add a quadratic in the index or restrict the sample (columns 2-6).  The lack of a size 
advantage for winning schools, further, holds whether we look at outcomes two or four 
(panels B and D, respectively) years after each allocation.  In short, we find no evidence 




The above results suggest that schools selected by the SNED either do not 
experience higher demand, or else choose to turn away students rather than expand.   
While it would be surprising for schools to entirely resist the opportunity to increase their   19
revenues, doing so might reflect that raising class sizes or opening new classrooms 
involves risk.  Additionally, schools might have made implicit commitments to parents 
regarding class and school size. 
We unfortunately do not have measures of excess demand, but in this and the next 
section we study two other ways in which schools could leverage increased demand:  by 
raising their prices or by becoming more selective in terms of socioeconomic status.  The 
first is relevant because the period we analyze was one in which the prevalence and 
magnitude of tuition charges were increasing.  For instance, in 1997, 38 percent of 
voucher schools charged add-on tuition, and the average was about 3 monthly dollars.  
By 2006, these figures had increased to 50 percent and 14 dollars, respectively. 
We first consider whether schools charge tuition at all,
33 which is useful partially 
because we do not observe grade-specific tuition, and average charges may move slowly 
if schools raise prices only for entering cohorts.  In contrast, going from zero to positive 
tuition is an outcome that is easily observed.  Figure 8a presents the graphical evidence, 
which is suggestive of no effect—there is no break in the relationship one year prior to 
the allocation (Panel E), and the fitted values one year prior and two years later 
essentially overlap (Panel F), particularly close to the cutoff.  For more detail, Table 8 
(Column 1) suggests that even within homogeneous groups, schools that receive an 
award are on average more likely to charge tuition, although the difference is not great.  
Controlling for the SNED index or restricting samples close to the cutoffs, however, 
eliminates significant differences—the point estimates in Column 4, our preferred 
specification, are essentially zero.  In the two year sample (Panels B) they rule out that 
awards increase the probability of charging tuition by more than two percent. 
The evidence on absolute tuition (panels A and B of Figure 8b, and Table 9) points 
to similar conclusions.  Whether we consider outcomes prior to the allocation or two or 
four years thereafter, award winners on average collect higher tuition (about 500 more 
pesos per month, equivalent to roughly a tenth of a standard deviation).  This is expected, 
if only given the positive correlation between the SNED index and socioeconomic status 
                                                 
33 As stated, primary municipal schools cannot charge tuition.  We verified that close to the discontinuities, 
there are no differences in the proportion of schools that are municipal (as opposed to private voucher).   20
(Figure 1).  As before, however, these differences become small and insignificant when 
we control for the SNED index or restrict the sample.  
 
D. Socioeconomic composition 
 
Turning to socioeconomic composition, we first analyze whether winning an award 
lowers schools’ vulnerability indices, which range from 0 (highest socioeconomic status) 
to 100 (lowest).  Table 10 (column 1) and Figure 8b (panels C and D) illustrate that even 
within homogeneous groups, winning schools have lower average vulnerability indices—
about four percentage points so (equivalent to one fifth of a standard deviation).  These 
estimates become smaller and insignificant as one adds controls or restricts samples close 
to the cutoffs (visually, there is no break at the cutoffs).  In short, the evidence does not 
suggest that SNED awards improved schools’ SES, although these estimates are 
somewhat less precise than those for enrollment, for instance, and in some cases do 
produce positive point estimates. 
We complement this evidence with direct measures of SES, although this raises 
several data-related issues.  Specifically, students’ socioeconomic characteristics are 
measured at the 4
th, 8
th, and 10
th grades (through the SIMCE testing system) and each of 
these grades is surveyed only every third year.
34  Adapting these data to regressions like 
those above therefore requires significant adjustments.  First, we assume 4
th grade 
information is representative of primary-aged children, ignoring the 8
th grade (if awards 
mainly impact the composition of entering cohorts, capturing changes using 8
th grade 
data would require longer time series than we have).  Second, we use only the 2000, 
2002, and 2004 SNED waves.  For the first two, we are able to look at outcomes two and 
four years later; for the last, only two years after each allocation.
35 
With these caveats, Figure 8b (panels E-H) and tables 11 and 12 present results on 
average mothers’ schooling and household income, respectively.  In each table, column 1 
                                                 
34 More specifically, we have 4
th grade observations for the 1999, 2000, 2002, 2005, and 2006 rounds. 
35 Specifically, we use the 1999 data as the “pre” observation for both the 2000 and 2002 waves; and the 
2002 tests as the pre-observation for the 2004 wave.  For the 2000 wave, the outcome two years later is 
naturally provided by the 2002 round; we use the 2005 test for the 4-years later outcome (as if it had been 
collected in 2004).  For the 2002 and 2004 waves, outcomes two years later are provided by the 2005 
(again, as if it had been collected in 2004) and 2006 waves. 
   21
indicates that even within homogeneous groups, SNED-winning schools have “better” 
peer groups—they contain children whose mothers have about 0.6 more years of 
schooling, and whose household income is about 20 thousand pesos higher (about 0.3 and 
0.4 of a standard deviation, respectively).  These differences mostly cease to be 
significant, however, when we restrict the sample to schools close to the cutoff; they 
mostly also become smaller, and in some cases even suggest negative award effects. 
  We underline that these results should be viewed with greater caution.  The 
sample sizes are smaller than those above, and the data are collected using questionnaires 
which parents sometimes do not send back. 
 
E.  Robustness checks:  Commune/homogeneous groups and secondary schools 
 
The estimates presented thus far rely on the SNED-constructed homogeneous 
groups.  As a robustness check (described in Section IV), we carry out similar exercises 
comparing schools that are in the same commune in addition to being in the same 
homogenous group.  Appendix tables A.1-A.4 (Panel A) implement this exercise, 
although for the sake of space we limit the discussion and focus on only three outcomes:  
enrollment, whether schools charge tuition, and vulnerability.
36  The conclusions are 
similar to those above save for two differences.  First, the estimates are somewhat less 
precise in part because the exercise results in smaller samples close to the cutoff scores.  
This may be behind a few estimates suggesting significantly positive and negative 
effects, although there is not consistent evidence in either direction.  Second, even more 
than among homogenous groups, there is persistence in SNED awards. 
Finally, Tables A.1 (Panel B) and A.5-A.7 consider the effects of the SNED at the 
secondary level.  We also limit these tables to three outcomes:  enrollment (in this case at 
the 9
th grade level), whether schools charge tuition, and vulnerability (also measured at 
the 9
th grade level).  The same two caveats raised with respect to commune/homogeneous 
groups apply:  relatively less precision and greater persistence in SNED awards.  That 
said, the conclusions are again qualitatively similar. 
                                                 
36 More specifically, Table A.1 (Panel A) presents the first stage.  Tables A.2, A.3, and A.4 present the 
enrollment, tuition, and vulnerability results, respectively.  We omitted the remaining outcomes because 
they produce similar conclusions—the associated tables are available upon request.   22
VI. Discussion 
 
A longstanding debate in the economics of education concerns to what extent 
improving educational quality, say as measured by test scores, could be achieved simply 
by relying on competition, and to what extent it would necessitate intervention through 
initiatives ranging from accountability (e.g., No child left behind) to raising expenditure.   
Researchers have noted that for competition alone to really deliver, it must be that 
parents’ choices, and therefore schools’ outcomes, depend on schools’ effectiveness in 
producing academic attainment.  If in contrast households view school choice as a means 
to obtain better peer groups or reduce travel time, then competition might encourage 
schools to improve on dimensions other than academic value added. 
Over the past decade the literature has produced evidence that parental school 
choice is indeed influenced by information on school quality, at least as measured by test 
scores.  Yet this does not answer the question at hand because, going back to the 
Coleman (1966) report, it is clear that test scores conflate school effectiveness and peer 
quality.  In the specific case of Chile, in fact, a ranking of schools based on their test 
scores is quite close to one based on their socioeconomic status. 
A key gap in our understanding of school markets, therefore, concerns whether 
parental choices and schools’ outcomes would respond to data on effectiveness per se, 
even if it were not necessarily correlated with peer quality.  This paper has attempted to 
begin filling that gap by analyzing Chile’s SNED, a scheme that seeks to measure 
effectiveness in a manner the public might understand.  Perhaps surprisingly, we fail to 
find systematic evidence that SNED awards impact schools’ market outcomes. 
These results are consistent with several possibilities.  First, while parents might 
value school effectiveness, information on it might in the end not sway school choices 
based on characteristics like peer composition.  This would rationalize stronger reactions 
to data on average performance than to information approximating effectiveness.  It 
would also be consistent with markets getting “stuck” in configurations in which 
wealthier parents, essentially due to coordination failures, are unable to access the most 
productive schools (Rothstein, 2006).  These issues might be particularly relevant in 
Chile, where school choice has likely given schools ample opportunities to differentiate.   23
Another potential explanation for our findings is that the SNED might not have 
registered with households, despite the fact that the program is eleven years old and there 
are many ways for parents to find out about it.  Alternately, the information it produces 
might be not “news”—parents might be able to deduce it on their own.  Such 
sophisticated parents might also realize that some of the information contained in the 
SNED might be noisy, and decide to discount it.  Finally, schools might respond to 
awards in ways that precisely counteract demand responses (for instance, by becoming 
more selective as demand increases), although one would expect this to show up in our 
measures of socioeconomic composition or tuition, and there is no clear evidence of that.   
Regardless of the explanation, our results have multiple policy implications.  Most 
immediately, “shaking” school markets through the provision of information might be 
harder than is commonly assumed.  More specifically, policy makers would like 
competition to reward and weed out firms along dimensions they value, and this may be 
hard to achieve regarding educational effectiveness.  If this is the case (and on a more 
speculative note), Chile might want to consider using test scores to more aggressively 
provide incentives for schools.   
More broadly, this raises a contrast between “American” and “Chilean” style 
accountability.  The U.S. has never implemented a national K-12 performance exam, and 
in some states households still have difficulty accessing data to compare achievement in 
their school with that in other (let alone comparable) institutions.  Nonetheless, through 
No Child Left Behind and their own initiatives, many states use test scores to offer 
schools carrots and sticks.  In contrast, while over the past two decades Chile has 
aggressively collected and disseminated school performance data, it has mainly exploited 
this information to inform consumers, offering schools few test-based incentives.   
In part, these differences reflect that many policy makers in the U.S. have seen 
accountability as an alternative way to generate incentives, in view of difficulties in 
expanding school choice.  In contrast, one could say many policy makers in Chile have 
seen the successful expansion of school choice as the key intervention, with 
accountability-type initiatives playing a secondary role. 
The impact of these approaches in their respective settings is controversial.  Our 
reading is that in the U.S. there is an emerging consensus that accountability can change   24
performance, albeit with, at times, unintended or distributional consequences.
37  I n  
contrast, our sense is that in Chile there is greater disappointment regarding the impact 
reforms have had on average academic performance (which is not at all to say these 
might not have raised average welfare).  Because the approaches described are not 
exclusive, this suggests Chile might want to consider further emphasizing the provision 
of direct American-style incentives.   
This point is related to a broader discussion regarding possible routes to improving 
social services in developing countries.  The World Bank (2004), for instance, suggests 
that information provision in itself can be quite effective, allowing users to better select 
and monitor providers.  Other work, like Banerjee and Duflo (2006) and Duflo and 
Hanna (2006), is consistent with assigning a greater role to direct incentives, and the 
results here would tend to support the latter. 
Last but not least, having invested extensively in testing information and schemes 
like the SNED, the Chilean government might choose to explore alternate ways of 
disseminating their results.  For instance, our sense is that economists and policy makers 
should devote more thought to better ways of transmitting information on school 
performance.  In Chile, this discussion has focused (and entailed some advances) on 
letting schools know where their results are relatively strong, where they are particularly 
weak, and what this may reflect.  This should also extend to letting parents know what 
test scores mean beyond a number that is higher or lower in this or that school.   
Additionally, Chile might find it worthwhile to invest in obtaining the type of data—such 
as that collected in a handful of U.S. states—that allows calculation of individual-level 
gains as students progress through the school system. 
    The bottom line is that as so many interventions in education, the provision of 
information might not be a “silver bullet” even when combined with extensive school 
choice.  As elsewhere, success might depend on the specifics of program design. 
                                                 
37 For instance, there is debate on whether accountability produces knowledge gains that generalize to 
various testing instruments, or rather leads schools to emphasize “teaching to the test” that impacts 
performance on only high-stakes exams; see Jacob (2007) for a review.  There is also concern that No Child 
Left Behind leads schools to focus on students at the margin of attaining given levels of proficiency, leading 
them to ignore low or high-achievers; See Reback (2006) and Neal and Whitmore Schanzenbach (2007).   25
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Note:  Panel A plots fitted values of locally weighted regressions of schools’ SNED index (and subindex) 
values on their average mothers’ schooling.  Panel B plots a histogram of observed SNED index values, 
using a bin size of 0.05.  Both panels cover 12,496 school/year observations from the 1998, 2000, 2002, 
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Figure 2:  Ministry of Education website output, 2007 
 
 
Note:  The figure shows an image of a Ministry of Education website which allows parents to type in a 
given commune (Lo Prado, in this example).  The site returns a listing of all the schools in the commune, 
including unique administrative identifiers (Column 1), their name (Column 2), and their SNED status 
(Column 6, which labels selected schools with a “SI” and non-selected schools with a “NO”).   30
Figure 3a:  Pictures of SNED winners in the municipality of Santiago, 2006 
 












































Note:  The figure displays pictures of banners announcing the featured schools’ selection in the 2006 SNED 
round.  These banners were posted at winning schools by the government of the Commune of Santiago.   31
Figure 3b:  Pictures of SNED winners in the municipality of Providencia, 2006 
 











































Note:  The figure displays pictures of banners announcing the featured schools’ selection in the 2006 SNED 
round.  These banners were posted at winning schools by the government of the Commune of Providencia. 
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Note:  The figure presents an image from La Segunda, a national newspaper.  The headline reads: 
“Exclusive in the Metropolitan Region—SIMCE results school by school.”  The tables then report, by 
commune, each school’s name, its type (municipal, voucher private, etc.), its enrollment, and its test scores 
in Math, Language, History, and Natural Sciences.   33
Figure 5:  Newspaper article on the SNED allocation, calculation, and teacher bonuses 
 
 
Note:  The figure presents an online version of a story in El Mercurio, a national newspaper.  It describes 
the implementation of the SNED in the metropolitan region, and notes the fact that teachers can receive 
non-negligible bonuses as a result of the scheme.  It highlights the fact that one specific teacher received an 
annual bonus of about 600 dollars.   34
Figure 6:  1
st stage 
Note:  Panel A plots index-cell means of a dummy indicating whether schools obtained a SNED award.  
Each school’s index is expressed relative to the normalized cutoff (the vertical line) in its respective 
homogeneous group.  For visual clarity index values are in 0.1 wide bins (Imbens and Lemieux, 2007).  
Panel B repeats the exercise where the index is measured relative to commune/homogeneous group cutoffs.  
Both panels describe the 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, and 2006 rounds.  Panel A is based on 12,496 
school/year observations, and panel B on 9,878 observations—the 2-year homogeneous groups and 
commune/homogenous group samples, respectively (see Section IV.D and Table 1, Panel B). 
 





























Note:  The figure illustrates the construction of commune/homogeneous groups.  In this hypothetical case, a 
homogeneous group contains three communes (communes are fully contained in regions, the basic 
geographical unit used in the construction of homogeneous groups).  The homogenous group-wide cutoff 
score is common to all three resulting commune/homogeneous groups.  For details, see Section IV.C. 
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Panel B: Commune/homogeneous groups  35
Figure 8a:  Outcomes at baseline and two years after (2-year primary samples) 
Note:  The left hand side panels plot index-cell means of schools’ outcomes one year prior to each round.  
Each school’s index is expressed relative to the normalized cutoff (the vertical line) in its respective 
homogeneous group.  For clarity, index values are in 0.1 wide bins (see Imbens and Lemieux, 2007).  The 
curves in these panels plot fitted values of locally weighted regressions of schools’ outcomes on their 
relative index values (estimated separately for schools with negative and non-negative values, both with a 
bandwidth of 0.2).  The right hand side panels replicate the fitted values from the left hand side, and add 
similar plots for outcomes two years after each round.  All estimates are for the primary school 2-year 
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Panel F: Positive tuition-1 yr. prior & 2 yrs. later  36
Figure 8b:  Outcomes at baseline and two years after (2-year primary samples) 
 
Note:  The left hand side panels plot index-cell means of schools’ outcomes one year prior to each round.  
Each school’s index is expressed relative to the normalized cutoff (the vertical line) in its respective 
homogeneous group.  For clarity, index values are in 0.1 wide bins (see Imbens and Lemieux, 2007).  The 
curves in these panels plot fitted values of locally weighted regressions of schools’ outcomes on their 
relative index values (estimated separately for schools with negative and non-negative values, both with a 
bandwidth of 0.2).  The right hand side panels replicate the fitted values from the left hand side, and add 
similar plots for outcomes two years after each round. All estimates are for the primary school 2-year 
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Panel H: Household income-1 yr. prior & 2 yrs. later  37
Table 1:  Homogenous groups, commune/homogenous groups, and sample sizes 
Sample and type of group Stacked
1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 data
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A:  Full sample
Homogeneous groups 114 104 109 110 110 --
       Total number of schools 9,060 9,247 9,465 9,681 9,681 --
       Avg. no. of schools per group 79.5 88.9 86.8 88.0 88.0 --
Commune/homogeneous groups  1,784 1,584 1,669 1,721 1,721 --
       Total number of schools 8,355 8,380 8,496 8,536 8,536 --
       Avg. no. of schools per group 4.7 5.3 5.1 5.0 5.0 --
Panel B: 2 year sample-Urban primary schools 
Homogeneous groups 34 32 32 31 31 160
       Total number of schools 2,422 2,460 2,527 2,484 2,603 12,496
       Avg. no. of schools per group 71.2 76.9 79.0 80.1 84.0 78.1
Commune/homogeneous groups  255 206 233 235 267 1,196
       Total number of schools 1,892 1,893 2,015 1,964 2,114 9,878
       Avg. no. of schools per group 7.4 9.2 8.6 8.4 7.9 8.3
Panel C: 4 year sample-Urban primary schools
Homogeneous groups 34 32 32 31 -- 129
       Total number of schools 2,378 2,378 2,461 2,442 -- 9,659
       Avg. no. of schools per group 69.9 74.3 76.9 78.8 -- 74.9
Commune/homogeneous groups  252 202 232 234 -- 920
       Total number of schools 1,847 1,819 1,959 1,928 -- 7,553
       Avg. no. of schools per group 7.3 9.0 8.4 8.2 -- 8.2
Panel D: 2 year sample-Urban secondary schools
Homogeneous groups 29 28 28 28 30 143
       Total number of schools 1,026 1,081 1,170 1,314 1,687 6,278
       Avg. no. of schools per group 35.4 38.6 41.8 46.9 56.2 43.9
Panel E: 4 year sample-Urban secondary schools
Homogeneous groups 29 28 28 28 -- 113
       Total number of schools 1,008 1,041 1,153 1,295 -- 4,497
       Avg. no. of schools per group 34.8 37.2 41.2 46.3 -- 39.8
SNED wave
 
Note:  Panel A describes all (primary and secondary) homogenous groups and commune/homogeneous 
groups in the country.  Panel B describes urban and primary level groups, covering only schools with valid 
indices for each SNED allocation, and for which there are at least enrollment outcomes one year prior and 
two years thereafter—we label this the 2-year sample.  Panel C describes urban and primary level groups, 
covering schools with valid indices for each allocation, and for which there are at least enrollment 
outcomes one year prior and four years thereafter—we label this the 4-year sample.  Panels D and E 
describe analogous 2 and 4-year samples for secondary level schools.  See Section IV.D.  
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Table 2:  Inputs and data sources for each of the SNED’s six sub-indices 
Sub-index Weight Measurement / Data source
(%)
Effectiveness 37 - SIMCE test score levels in Language and Math, measured at the 4th, 8th, and 10th grade
   levels, for the latest testing round available
Improvement 28 - SIMCE inter-cohort gains for the 4th, 8th, and 10th grade levels, measured using the two
   most recently available testing rounds
Equality of 22 - Repetition and dropout rates (account for 50 percent of the total Equality of Opportunity
      opportunity    component); measured using administrative data
- Absence of discriminatory practices, such as removing children who fail a grade or become
  pregnant, or rejecting students when vacancies exist (this accounts for 40 percent of the 
   total Equality of Opportunity component); measured via a questionnaire administered to
  Ministry of Education inspectors.
- Integration of physically challenged students, measured via a school-level survey; absence 
  of improper punishments, measured via a survey administered to Ministry of Education
  school inspectors; (these account for 10 percent of the total Equality component) 
Initiative 6 - Schools' educational activities and initiatives, measured using a survey given to administrators
Parent/teacher  5 - Parental participation and information availability; measured via a school-level survey
      participation - Parents' perceptions about the quality of the school; measured via a SIMCE survey
Working conditions 2 - Schools' placement in a Ministry of Education inspection system
 
Source:  Authors’ preparation and Mizala and Romaguera (2004).    
 
 
Table 3:  Information on schools’ dissemination efforts, 2003 
How does the  Type of The school does  The school The school The school  The schools
school inform school not inform  informs only if informs the informs via holds 
parents parents parents  request board of the notes or other information
regarding its: data parents'  written media meetings with
association sent home parents
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
SNED status Public 8.3 9.4 36.8 16.7 28.7
Private voucher 3.9 6.8 35.9 27.0 26.4
SIMCE results Public 1.0 3.7 27.5 45.6 22.2
Private voucher 0.2 3.1 26.3 49.3 21.1
 
Note:  The information is based on a survey of schools collected by the Ministry of Education in 2003. 
  
 
Table 4:  Dependent variable—schools average (math and language) test score 









(0.63) (0.62) (0.61) (0.62) (1.74) (1.70) (1.21) (1.18)







(0.32) (0.31) (0.29) (0.87) (0.61) (0.59)





(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)





(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.04)




Homogeneous group dummies No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
R2 0.435 0.475 0.528 0.584 0.611 0.673 0.860 0.867
N 4,108 4,108 4,108 4,108 1,137 1,137 1,137 1,137
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Dep. Var.: 8th grade math score in 2004 Dep. Var.: 10th grade math score in 2003
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Note:  Columns 1-4 refer to primary level information and columns 5-8 to secondary data.  The mothers’ 
schooling, income, and previous score controls are for 2002 and 2000 for the primary schools, and 2001 
and 1998 for the secondary ones.  The controls and test scores for 2002 and 2000 are at the 4
th and 8
th 
grade, respectively, and the those for 2001 and 1998 are at the 10
th grade level.   39
Table 5:  First stage regressions 







(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.007) (0.000)
Quadratic in index No Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2 0.997 0.997 0.996 0.983 1.000
N 12,496 12,496 5,755 1,257 2,571







(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.009) (0.000)
Quadratic in index No Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2 0.997 0.997 0.994 0.979 1.000
N 9,659 9,659 4,508 1,000 1,389






(0.012) (0.018) (0.027) (0.057) (0.049)
Quadratic in index No Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2 0.112 0.138 0.063 0.089 0.173
N 9,659 9,659 4,508 1,000 1,389
All schools subject to sample selections: Higher SES 2004 and
All All Within
groups only 2006 rounds
1
Within Within









Note:  The table presents 1
st stage regressions based on cutoff scores at the homogeneous group level.  The 
dependent variable indicates whether schools received an award, and the key independent variable indicates 
if their index was greater than or equal to their respective group’s cutoff.  Panels A and B-C refer to the 2- 
and 4-year samples respectively (See Section IV.D and Table 1).  
***,
**, and 
* denote significance at the 1, 
5, and 10 percent level, respectively. 
1 For the 4-year sample, the table excludes the 2006 SNED wave, since outcomes are not available. 
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Table 6:  1
st grade enrollment 
Panel A: 2-year sample; Dep. var.: Enrollment 1 year prior to allocation
1{Index≥0} 7.5
*** -0.8 -0.4 0.9 0.3
(1.2) (1.8) (2.1) (4.5) (2.7)
Quadratic in index No Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2 0.006 0.027 0.003 0.002 0.003
N 12,496 12,496 5,755 1,257 2,571
Panel B: 2-year sample; Dep. var.: Enrollment 2 years after allocation
1{Index≥0} 9.3
*** -0.3 -0.9 -0.2 -0.6 -1.7
(1.1) (1.7) (1.9) (0.8) (1.8) (1.1)




      prior to allocation (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Quadratic in index No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2 0.011 0.034 0.004 0.812 0.808 0.820
N 12,496 12,496 5,755 5,755 1,257 2,571
Panel C: 4-year sample; Dep. var.: Enrollment 1 year prior to allocation
1{Index≥0} 7.2
*** -0.2 0.2 0.6 2.1
(1.3) (1.9) (2.4) (4.9) (3.8)
Quadratic in index No Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2 0.005 0.022 0.004 0.006 0.004
N 9,659 9,659 4,508 1,000 1,389
Panel D: 4-year sample; Dep. var.: Enrollment 4 years after allocation
1{Index≥0} 9.4
*** 0.0 -0.0 -0.2 0.7 0.7
(1.2) (1.7) (2.1) (1.0) (2.5) (1.7)




      prior to allocation (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Quadratic in index No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2 0.012 0.034 0.004 0.743 0.757 0.781
N 9,659 9,659 4,508 4,508 1,000 1,389
2004 and
groups only 2006 rounds
1
Within Within
All schools subject to sample selections: Higher SES
Within Within
0.5 points 0.5 points
All All
0.5 points 0.5 points
of the of the of the of the
cutoff cutoff cutoff cutoff
(5) (6) (1) (2) (3) (4)
 
Note:  The table presents regressions of schools’ 1
st grade enrollment on a dummy for whether their SNED 
index was greater than or equal to the cutoff score in their respective homogeneous group.  Panels A-B and 




significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. 
1 For the 4-year sample, the table excludes the 2006 SNED wave, since outcomes are not available.  In 
addition, both samples treat the 2007 observations as if they had been taken in 2008—see Section IV.D. 
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Table 7:  Number of 1
st grade classes 
Panel A: 2-year sample; Dep. var.: No. of classes 1 year prior to allocation
1{Index≥0} 0.11
*** -0.02 0.01 0.06 0.03
(0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.10) (0.06)
Quadratic in index No Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2 0.002 0.017 0.002 0.001 0.002
N 12,077 12,077 5,666 1,246 2,536
Panel B: 2-year sample; Dep. var.: No. of classes 2 years after allocation
1{Index≥0} 0.13
*** -0.03 -0.04 -0.05
** -0.05 -0.08
**
(0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03)




      prior to allocation (0.01) (0.03) (0.01)
Quadratic in index No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2 0.004 0.021 0.002 0.725 0.743 0.707
N 12,077 12,077 5,666 5,666 1,246 2,536
Panel C: 4-year sample; Dep. var.: No. of classes 1 year prior to allocation
1{Index≥0} 0.11
*** -0.02 0.02 0.05 0.05
(0.03) (0.04) (0.06) (0.11) (0.09)
Quadratic in index No Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2 0.001 0.014 0.003 0.004 0.002
N 9,264 9,264 4,413 983 1,371
Panel D: 4-year sample; Dep. var.: No. of classes 4 years after allocation
1{Index≥0} 0.14
*** -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03
(0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.07) (0.05)




      prior to allocation (0.01) (0.03) (0.02)
Quadratic in index No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2 0.005 0.020 0.002 0.660 0.689 0.673
N 9,264 9,264 4,413 4,413 983 1,371
2004 and
groups only 2006 rounds
1
Within Within
All schools subject to sample selections: Higher SES
Within Within
0.5 points 0.5 points
All All
0.5 points 0.5 points
of the of the of the of the
cutoff cutoff cutoff cutoff
(5) (6) (1) (2) (3) (4)
 
Note:  The table presents regressions of the number of 1
st grades schools operate on a dummy for whether 
their SNED index was greater than or equal to the cutoff score in their respective homogeneous group.  




* denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. 
1 For the 4-year sample, the table excludes the 2006 SNED wave, since outcomes are not available.  In 
addition, both samples treat the 2007 observations as if they had been taken in 2008—see Section IV.D. 
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Table 8:  Positive tuition 
Panel A: 2-year sample; Dep. var.: Positive tuition 1 year prior to allocation
1{Index≥0} 0.03
** 0.01 -0.02 -0.03 0.03
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.06) (0.04)
Quadratic in index No Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.007 0.002
N 9,893 9,893 4,585 1,019 1,401
Panel B: 2-year sample; Dep. var.: Positive tuition 2 years after allocation
1{Index≥0} 0.04
*** 0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.01 -0.01
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)




      prior to allocation (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Quadratic in index No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.907 0.884 0.943
N 9,893 9,893 4,585 4,585 1,019 1,401
Panel C: 4-year sample; Dep. var.: Positive tuition 1 year prior to allocation
1{Index≥0} 0.04
*** 0.01 -0.04 -0.06 --
(0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.07) --
Quadratic in index No Yes Yes Yes --
R
2 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.010 --
N 7,217 7,217 3,119 710 --
Panel D: 4-year sample; Dep. var.: Positive tuition 4 years after allocation
1{Index≥0} 0.05
*** 0.02 -0.03 0.01 0.01 --
(0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) --
Positive tuition 1 year 0.95
*** 0.92
*** --
      prior to allocation (0.01) (0.02) --
Quadratic in index No Yes Yes Yes Yes --
R
2 0.003 0.005 0.004 0.868 0.847 --
N 7,217 7,217 3,119 3,119 710 --
2004 and
groups only 2006 rounds
1
Within Within
All schools subject to sample selections: Higher SES
Within Within
0.5 points 0.5 points
All All
0.5 points 0.5 points
of the of the of the of the
cutoff cutoff cutoff cutoff
(5) (6) (1) (2) (3) (4)
 
Note:  The table presents regressions of an indicator for whether schools charge tuition on a dummy for 
whether their SNED index was greater than or equal to the cutoff score in their respective homogeneous 




* denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. 
1 Because we only have tuition data up to 2006 (inclusive), for the 2-year sample the analysis in Column 6 
refers only to the 2004 wave.  For the 4-year sample (panels C and D), this specification is not feasible. 
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Table 9:  Tuition 
Panel A: 2-year sample; Dep. var.: Tuition 1 year prior to allocation
1{Index≥0} 0.35
*** 0.15 -0.17 -0.65 0.09
(0.12) (0.14) (0.20) (0.69) (0.41)
Quadratic in index No Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.006 0.003
N 9,893 9,893 4,585 1,019 1,401
Panel B: 2-year sample; Dep. var.: Tuition 2 years after allocation
1{Index≥0} 0.51
*** 0.20 -0.25 -0.05 0.09 -0.19
(0.15) (0.18) (0.26) (0.10) (0.32) (0.16)




      prior to allocation (0.04) (0.05) (0.03)
Quadratic in index No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.846 0.840 0.927
N 9,893 9,893 4,585 4,585 1,019 1,401
Panel C: 4-year sample; Dep. var.: Tuition 1 year prior to allocation
1{Index≥0} 0.39
** 0.18 -0.25 -0.68 --
(0.13) (0.16) (0.23) (0.79) --
Quadratic in index No Yes Yes Yes --
R
2 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.006 --
N 7,217 7,217 3,119 710 --
Panel D: 4-year sample; Dep. var.: Tuition 4 years after allocation
1{Index≥0} 0.78
*** 0.30 -0.39 -0.06 -0.02 --
(0.19) (0.23) (0.34) (0.15) (0.46) --
Tuition 1 year 1.32
*** 1.23
*** --
      prior to allocation (0.05) (0.07) --
Quadratic in index No Yes Yes Yes Yes --
R
2 0.004 0.006 0.004 0.807 0.798 --
N 7,217 7,217 3,119 3,119 710 --
(5) (6) (1) (2) (3) (4)
cutoff cutoff cutoff cutoff
of the of the of the of the
0.5 points 0.5 points
All All
0.5 points 0.5 points
2004
groups only 2006 rounds
1
Within Within
All schools subject to sample selections: Higher SES
Within Within
 
Note:  The table presents regressions of schools’ tuition on a dummy for whether their SNED index was 
greater than or equal to the cutoff score in their respective homogeneous group.  Panels A-B and C-D refer 
to the 2- and 4-year samples, respectively (See Section IV.D and Table 1).  
***,
**, and 
* denote significance 
at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. 
1 Because we only have tuition data up to 2006 (inclusive), for the 2-year sample the analysis in Column 6 
refers only to the 2004 wave.  For the 4-year sample (panels C and D), this specification is not feasible. 
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Table 10:  Vulnerability index measured at the 1
st grade  
Panel A: 2-year sample; Dep. var.: Vulnerability index 1 year prior to allocation
1{Index≥0} -5.4
*** -0.4 0.2 0.9 -0.5
(0.5) (0.7) (1.0) (1.6) (1.1)
Quadratic in index No Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2 0.014 0.040 0.004 0.020 0.003
N 10,640 10,640 4,970 760 2,201
Panel B: 2-year sample; Dep. var.: Vulnerability index 2 years after allocation
1{Index≥0} -1.5
*** 0.5 -0.2 -0.3 -1.4 0.0
(0.5) (0.8) (1.2) (1.1) (2.4) (1.8)




      prior to allocation (0.02) (0.04) (0.02)
Quadratic in index No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2 0.001 0.015 0.002 0.093 0.020 0.118
N 10,640 10,640 4,970 4,970 760 2,201
Panel C: 4-year sample; Dep. var.: Vulnerability index 1 year prior to allocation
1{Index≥0} -5.0
*** 0.8 0.1 2.2 -1.1
(0.6) (0.8) (1.1) (2.0) (1.5)
Quadratic in index No Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2 0.011 0.043 0.002 0.022 0.001
N 7,953 7,953 3,744 531 1,149
Panel D: 4-year sample; Dep. var.: Vulnerability index 4 years after allocation
1{Index≥0} -3.6
*** -2.5 -1.8 1.8 -0.8 -1.0
0.6 (1.0) (1.5) (1.5) (3.0) (1.1)




      prior to allocation (0.02) (0.04) (0.02)
Quadratic in index No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.038 0.040 0.282
N 7,953 7,953 3,744 3,744 531 1,149
(5) (6) (1) (2) (3) (4)
cutoff cutoff cutoff cutoff
of the of the of the of the
0.5 points 0.5 points
All All
0.5 points 0.5 points
2004 and
groups only 2006 rounds
1
Within Within
All schools subject to sample selections: Higher SES
Within Within
 
Note:  The table presents regressions of schools’ vulnerability index values on a dummy for whether their 
SNED index was greater than or equal to the cutoff score in their respective homogeneous group.  Panels 




denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. 
1 For the 4-year sample, the table excludes the 2006 SNED wave, since outcomes are not available.  In 
addition, both samples treat the 2007 observations as if they had been taken in 2008—see Section IV.D. 
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Table 11:  Average mothers’ schooling 
Panel A: 2-year sample; Dep. var.: Avg. mothers' schooling 1 year prior to allocation
1{Index≥0} 0.56
*** 0.14
** 0.09 -0.23 0.25
(0.05) (0.07) (0.10) (0.15) (0.17)
Quadratic in index No Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2 0.020 0.046 0.006 0.037 0.008
N 7,102 7,102 3,612 655 1,381
Panel B: 2-year sample; Dep. var.: Avg. mothers' schooling 2 years after allocation
1{Index≥0} 0.53
*** 0.11 0.03 -0.06 -0.16 -0.06
(0.05) (0.08) (0.10) (0.05) (0.10) (0.08)




      prior to allocation (0.01) (0.03) (0.01)
Quadratic in index No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2 0.018 0.039 0.006 0.754 0.524 0.766
N 7,102 7,102 3,612 3,612 655 1,381
Panel C: 4-year sample; Dep. var.: Avg. mothers' schooling 1 year prior to allocation
1{Index≥0} 0.59
*** 0.11 0.02 -0.40
*** --
(0.06) (0.09) (0.13) (0.20) --
Quadratic in index No Yes Yes Yes --
R
2 0.022 0.047 0.008 0.050 --
N 4,565 4,565 2,190 357 --
Panel D: 4-year sample; Dep. var.: Avg. mothers' schooling 4 years after allocation
1{Index≥0} 0.59
*** 0.10 -0.01 -0.02 -0.04 --
(0.06) (0.10) (0.13) (0.07) (0.14) --
Mothers' sch. 1 year 0.86
*** 0.91
*** --
      prior to allocation (0.01) (0.05) --
Quadratic in index No Yes Yes Yes Yes --
R
2 0.022 0.044 0.008 0.742 0.641 --
N 4,565 4,565 2,190 2,190 357 --
(5) (6) (1) (2) (3) (4)
cutoff cutoff cutoff cutoff
of the of the of the of the
0.5 points 0.5 points
All All
0.5 points 0.5 points
2004 and
groups only 2006 rounds
1
Within Within
All schools subject to sample selections: Higher SES
Within Within
 
Note:  The table presents regressions of schools’ average mothers’ schooling on a dummy for whether their 
SNED index was greater than or equal to the cutoff score in their respective homogeneous group.  Panels 




denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. 
1 Because we only have mothers’ schooling data up to 2006 (inclusive), for the 2-year sample the analysis 
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Table 12:  Household income 
Panel A: 2-year sample; Dep. var.: Avg. hhld. income 1 year prior to allocation
1{Index≥0} 19.9
*** 10.2
*** 8.1 -0.9 14.3
*
(2.8) (3.7) (5.6) (17.8) (8.5)
Quadratic in index No Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2 0.011 0.018 0.004 0.014 0.004
N 7,104 7,104 3,612 655 1,381
Panel B: 2-year sample; Dep. var.: Avg. hhld. income 2 years after allocation
1{Index≥0} 25.4
*** 10.1
** 5.3 -3.0 -7.6 -8.9
*
(3.4) (4.4) (6.3) (3.1) (9.7) (4.8)




      prior to allocation (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Quadratic in index No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2 0.012 0.024 0.004 0.748 0.679 0.765
N 7,104 7,104 3,612 3,612 655 1,381
Panel C: 4-year sample; Dep. var.: Avg. hhld. income 1 year prior to allocation
1{Index≥0} 21.9
*** 8.6
* 5.6 -8.1 --
(3.2) (4.8) (7.4) (26.5) --
Quadratic in index No Yes Yes Yes --
R
2 0.014 0.021 0.007 0.026 --
N 4,566 4,566 2,190 357 --
Panel D: 4-year sample; Dep. var.: Avg. hhld. income 4 years after allocation
1{Index≥0} 28.6
*** 10.3
* 4.9 -1.3 3.5 --
(4.2) (6.0) (9.1) (4.2) (14.6) --
Hhld. income 1 year 1.10
*** 1.06
*** --
      prior to allocation (0.07) (0.05) --
Quadratic in index No Yes Yes Yes Yes --
R
2 0.014 0.024 0.006 0.748 0.718 --
N 4,566 4,566 2,190 2,190 357 --
(5) (6) (1) (2) (3) (4)
cutoff cutoff cutoff cutoff
of the of the of the of the
0.5 points 0.5 points
All All
0.5 points 0.5 points
2004 and
groups only 2006 rounds
1
Within Within
All schools subject to sample selections: Higher SES
Within Within
 
Note:  The table presents regressions of schools’ average household income on a dummy for whether their 
SNED index was greater than or equal to the cutoff score in their respective homogeneous group.  Panels 
A-B and C-D refer to the 2- and 4-year samples, respectively (See Section IV.D and the notes to Table 1).  
***,
**, and 
* denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. 
1 Because we only have household income data up to 2006 (inclusive), for the 2-year sample the analysis in 
Column 6 refers only to the 2004 wave.  For the 4-year sample (panels C and D), this specification is not 
feasible. 
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Table A.1:  1
st stage regressions for primary level commune/homogeneous groups and 
secondary level homogeneous groups 
Note:  The table presents 1
st stage regressions for primary level commune/homogeneous groups (panels A-
C) and secondary level homogeneous groups (panels D-F).  The dependent variable indicates whether 
schools received a SNED award, and the key independent variable indicates if their index was greater than 
or equal to their reference groups.  
***,
**, and 
* denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, 
respectively. 
1 For the 4-year sample, the table excludes the 2006 SNED wave, since outcomes are not available. 
Primary level commune/homogeneous groups







(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Quadratic in index No Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2 0.999 1.000 0.999 0.996 1.000
N 9,878 9,878 4,116 927 1,858







(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Quadratic in index No Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.995 1.000
N 7,553 7,553 3,198 742 986







(0.013) (0.016) (0.031) (0.062) (0.053)
Quadratic in index No Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2 0.124 0.141 0.063 0.070 0.174
N 7,553 7,553 3,198 742 986
Secondary level homogeneous groups







(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.008) (0.000)
Quadratic in index No Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2 0.999 0.999 0.998 0.994 1.000
N 6,278 6,278 2,524 665 1,255







(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.011) (0.000)
Quadratic in index No Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2 0.999 0.999 0.998 0.992 1.000
N 4,497 4,497 1,897 498 652







(0.017) (0.026) (0.042) (0.078) (0.071)
Quadratic in index No Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2 0.200 0.219 0.140 0.108 204.000
N 4,497 4,497 1,897 498 652
Within
0.50 points
All All Within Within
0.50 points 0.50 points
All schools subject to sample selections: Higher SES 2004 and




of the of the
(6) (1) (2) (3) (5)  48
Table A.2:  1
st grade enrollment among commune/homogeneous groups 
Panel A: 2-year sample; Dep. var.: Enrollment 1 year prior to allocation
1{Index≥0} 8.5
*** -0.9 -3.1 1.7 -5.9
*
(1.3) (2.0) (2.6) (5.1) (3.2)
Quadratic in index No Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2 0.008 0.026 0.002 0.001 0.005
N 9,878 9,878 4,116 927 1,858
Panel B: 2-year sample; Dep. var.: Enrollment 2 years after allocation
1{Index≥0} 10.2
*** -0.3 -2.4 0.2 -1.7 0.0
(1.2) (1.9) (2.4) (0.9) (2.1) (1.3)




      prior to allocation (0.01) (0.03) (0.01)
Quadratic in index No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2 0.014 0.034 0.003 0.825 0.806 0.838
N 9,878 9,878 4,116 4,116 927 1,858
Panel C: 4-year sample; Dep. var.: Enrollment 1 year prior to allocation
1{Index≥0} 8.0
*** -0.4 -3.1 -0.7 8.2
*
(1.4) (2.1) (2.9) (5.6) (4.4)
Quadratic in index No Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2 0.007 0.021 0.003 0.002 0.009
N 7,553 7,553 3,198 742 986
Panel D: 4-year sample; Dep. var.: Enrollment 4 years after allocation
1{Index≥0} 10.3
*** -0.4 -2.7 -0.2 -3.5 1.4
(1.3) (2.0) (2.6) (1.2) (2.7) (2.0)




      prior to allocation (0.01) (0.03) (0.02)
Quadratic in index No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2 0.015 0.036 0.005 0.769 0.760 0.803
N 7,553 7,553 3,198 3,198 742 986
2004 and
groups only 2006 rounds
1
Within Within
All schools subject to sample selections: Higher SES
Within Within
0.5 points 0.5 points
All All
0.5 points 0.5 points
of the of the of the of the
cutoff cutoff cutoff cutoff
(5) (6) (1) (2) (3) (4)
 
Note:  The table presents regressions of schools’ 1
st grade enrollment on a dummy for whether their SNED 
index was greater than or equal to the cutoff score in their respective commune/homogeneous group.   




* denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. 
1 For the 4-year sample, the table excludes the 2006 SNED wave, since outcomes are not available.  In 
addition, both samples treat the 2007 observations as if they had been taken in 2008—see Section IV.D. 
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Table A.3:  Positive tuition among commune/homogeneous groups 
Panel A: 2-year sample; Dep. var.: Positive tuition 1 year prior to allocation
1{Index≥0} 0.03
** 0.02 -0.00 0.05 0.00
(0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.07) (0.05)
Quadratic in index No Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.008 0.003
N 7,764 7,764 3,252 750 994
Panel B: 2-year sample; Dep. var.: Positive tuition 2 years after allocation
1{Index≥0} 0.03
*** 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.03
* 0.00
(0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)




      prior to allocation (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Quadratic in index No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2 0.001 0.002 0.005 0.913 0.913 0.940
N 7,764 7,764 3,252 3,252 750 994
Panel C: 4-year sample; Dep. var.: Positive tuition 1 year prior to allocation
1{Index≥0} 0.04
*** 0.01 0.00 0.03 --
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.08) --
Quadratic in index No Yes Yes Yes --
R
2 0.002 0.002 0.005 0.125 --
N 5,625 5,625 2,212 524 --
Panel D: 4-year sample; Dep. var.: Positive tuition 4 years after allocation
1{Index≥0} 0.05
*** 0.05
** 0.02 0.02 0.06 --
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) --
Positive tuition 1 year 0.96
*** 0.94
*** --
      prior to allocation (0.01) (0.02) --
Quadratic in index No Yes Yes Yes Yes --
R
2 0.003 0.003 0.006 0.882 0.893 --
N 5,625 5,625 2,212 2,212 524 --
2004 and
groups only 2006 rounds
1
Within Within
All schools subject to sample selections: Higher SES
Within Within
0.5 points 0.5 points
All All
0.5 points 0.5 points
of the of the of the of the
(6) (1)
cutoff cutoff cutoff cutoff
(2) (3) (4) (5)
 
Note:  The table presents regressions of an indicator for whether schools charge tuition on a dummy for 
whether their SNED index was greater than or equal to the cutoff score in their respective 
commune/homogeneous group.  Panels A-B and C-D refer to the 2- and 4-year samples, respectively (See 
Section IV.D and Table 1).  
***,
**, and 
* denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. 
1 Because we only have tuition data up to 2006 (inclusive), for the 2-year sample the analysis in Column 6 
refers only to the 2004 wave.  For the 4-year sample (panels C and D), this specification is not feasible. 
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Table A.4:  Vulnerability (at the 1
st grade) among commune/homogeneous groups 
Panel A: 2-year sample; Dep. var.: Vulnerability index 1 year prior to allocation
1{Index≥0} -5.3
*** 0.6 4.2 1.3 3.0
**
(0.6) (0.9) (1.1) (1.6) (1.4)
Quadratic in index No Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2 0.015 0.043 0.008 0.016 0.013
N 8,333 8,333 3,539 567 1,580
Panel B: 2-year sample; Dep. var.: Vulnerability index 2 years after allocation
1{Index≥0} -2.0
*** 0.8 2.4
* 0.8 0.9 3.6
*
(0.6) (0.9) (1.3) (1.3) (2.6) (2.1)




      prior to allocation (0.02) (0.05) (0.03)
Quadratic in index No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2 0.002 0.015 0.001 0.098 0.011 0.120
N 8,333 8,333 3,539 3,539 567 1,580
Panel C: 4-year sample; Dep. var.: Vulnerability index 1 year prior to allocation
1{Index≥0} -4.9
*** 1.7
* 0.1 1.0 3.8
**
(0.6) (1.0) (1.1) (1.9) (1.7)
Quadratic in index No Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2 0.012 0.047 0.002 0.007 0.011
N 6,145 6,145 2,638 392 808






(0.7) (1.1) (1.8) (1.7) (3.8) (1.2)




      prior to allocation (0.02) (0.07) (0.03)
Quadratic in index No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2 0.006 0.007 0.014 0.058 0.050 0.310
N 6,145 6,145 2,638 2,638 392 808
(4) (5) (6) (1)
cutoff cutoff cutoff cutoff
of the of the of the of the
Within
0.5 points 0.5 points
All All
0.5 points 0.5 points
(2) (3)
2004 and
groups only 2006 rounds
1
Within Within
All schools subject to sample selections: Higher SES
Within
 
Note:  The table presents regressions of schools’ vulnerability index values on a dummy for whether their 
SNED index was greater than or equal to the cutoff score in their respective commune/homogeneous group.  




* denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. 
1 For the 4-year sample, the table excludes the 2006 SNED wave, since outcomes are not available.  In 
addition, both samples treat the 2007 observations as if they had been taken in 2008—see Section IV.D. 
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Table A.5:  9
th grade enrollment among secondary schools 
Panel A: 2-year sample; Dep. var.: Enrollment 1 year prior to allocation
1{Index≥0} -31.1
*** -28.7
*** -12.7 7.2 -19.7
(5.9) (6.4) (10.1) (11.8) (13.0)
Quadratic in index No Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.002 0.016
N 6,278 6,278 2,524 665 1,255
Panel B: 2-year sample; Dep. var.: Enrollment 2 years after allocation
1{Index≥0} -25.2
*** -29.1
*** -10.8 1.2 -3.2 4.6
(5.7) (6.6) (10.0) (3.2) (3.9) (3.9)




      prior to allocation (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Quadratic in index No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2 0.006 0.007 0.010 0.875 0.918 0.902
N 6,278 6,278 2,524 2,524 665 1,255
Panel C: 4-year sample; Dep. var.: Enrollment 1 year prior to allocation
1{Index≥0} -37.2
*** -24.7
*** -9.5 -1.8 -15.9
(6.8) (7.7) (12.1) (13.4) (19.8)
Quadratic in index No Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2 0.011 0.013 0.013 0.001 0.037
N 4,497 4,497 1,897 498 652
Panel D: 4-year sample; Dep. var.: Enrollment 4 years after allocation
1{Index≥0} -30.9
*** -18.8
** -7.6 1.0 -3.2 -0.6
(6.6) (7.9) (11.7) (4.0) (5.0) (5.6)




      prior to allocation (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Quadratic in index No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2 0.009 0.011 0.010 0.847 0.888 0.870
N 4,497 4,497 1,897 1,897 498 652
(4) (5) (6) (1)
cutoff cutoff cutoff cutoff
of the of the of the of the
Within
0.5 points 0.5 points
All All
0.5 points 0.5 points
(2) (3)
2004 and
groups only 2006 rounds
1
Within Within
All schools subject to sample selections: Higher SES
Within
 
Note:  The table presents regressions of schools’ 9th grade enrollment on a dummy for whether their SNED 
index was greater than or equal to the cutoff score in their respective homogeneous group.  Panels A-B and 




significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. 
1 For the 4-year sample, the table excludes the 2006 SNED wave, since outcomes are not available.  In 
addition, both samples treat the 2007 observations as if they had been taken in 2008—see Section IV.D.   52
Table A.6:  Positive tuition at the secondary level 
Panel A: 2-year sample; Dep. var.: Positive tuition 1 year prior to allocation
1{Index≥0} 0.12
*** 0.09
*** 0.08 -0.02 0.15
**
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.06) (0.07)
Quadratic in index No Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2 0.011 0.012 0.008 0.000 0.010
N 4,591 4,591 1,928 502 659
Panel B: 2-year sample; Dep. var.: Positive tuition 2 years after allocation
1{Index≥0} 0.12
*** 0.08 0.10
** 0.03 0.01 0.01
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01)




      prior to allocation (0.01) (0.06) (0.01)
Quadratic in index No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2 0.010 0.012 0.008 0.835 0.671 0.932
N 4,591 4,591 1,928 1,928 502 659
Panel C: 4-year sample; Dep. var.: Positive tuition 1 year prior to allocation
1{Index≥0} 0.14
*** 0.09 0.05 -0.06 --
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.08) --
Quadratic in index No Yes Yes Yes --
R
2 0.014 0.015 0.010 0.003 --
N 3,202 3,202 1,245 323 --
Panel D: 4-year sample; Dep. var.: Positive tuition 4 years after allocation
1{Index≥0} 0.13
*** 0.08 0.07 0.02 -0.04 --
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.02) (0.05) --
Positive tuition 1 year 0.87
*** 0.66
*** --
      prior to allocation (0.02) (0.07) --
Quadratic in index No Yes Yes Yes Yes --
R
2 0.012 0.013 0.008 0.765 0.600 --
N 3,202 3,202 1,245 1,245 323 --
(4) (5) (6) (1)
cutoff cutoff cutoff cutoff
of the of the of the of the
Within
0.5 points 0.5 points
All All
0.5 points 0.5 points
(2) (3)
2004 and
groups only 2006 rounds
1
Within Within
All schools subject to sample selections: Higher SES
Within
 
Note:  The table presents regressions of an indicator for whether schools charge tuition on a dummy for 
whether their SNED index was greater than or equal to the cutoff score in their respective homogeneous 
group.  Panels A-B and C-D refer to the 2- and 4-year samples, respectively (See Section IV.D Table 1).  
***,
**, and 
* denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. 
1 Because we only have tuition data up to 2006 (inclusive), for the 2-year sample the analysis in Column 6 
refers only to the 2004 wave.  For the 4-year sample (panels C and D), this analysis is not feasible. 
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Table A.7:  Vulnerability at the secondary level 





(0.9) (1.3) (1.9) (4.3) (2.1)
Quadratic in index No Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2 0.031 0.032 0.030 0.064 0.061
N 4,145 4,145 1,617 216 724
Panel B: 2-year sample; Dep. var.: Vulnerability index 2 years after allocation
1{Index≥0} -4.2
*** -0.1
*** -0.6 0.6 -6.6 2.6
(0.9) (1.4) (2.1) (2.0) (5.0) (3.0)
Vulnerability 1 year 0.32
*** 0.08 0.41
***
      prior to allocation (0.03) (0.08) (0.04)
Quadratic in index No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2 0.006 0.015 0.003 0.087 0.020 0.089
N 4,145 4,145 1,617 1,617 216 724
Panel C: 4-year sample; Dep. var.: Vulnerability index 1 year prior to allocation
1{Index≥0} -5.8
*** -5.9
*** -3.5 -6.8 3.2
(1.0) (1.5) (2.3) (6.6) (3.1)
Quadratic in index No Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2 0.015 0.015 0.017 0.120 0.040
N 2,614 2,614 1,050 100 303
Panel D: 4-year sample; Dep. var.: Vulnerability index 4 years after allocation
1{Index≥0} -5.4
*** -7.6
*** -3.2 -2.3 -8.3 -2.4
(1.1) (1.8) (2.8) (2.7) (7.0) (2.2)




      prior to allocation (0.04) (0.11) (0.04)
Quadratic in index No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2 0.009 0.028 0.023 0.066 0.139 0.040
N 2,614 2,614 1,050 1,050 100 303
2004 and
groups only 2006 rounds
1
Within Within
All schools subject to sample selections: Higher SES
Within Within
0.5 points 0.5 points 0.5 points 0.5 points
All All
of the of the of the of the
cutoff cutoff cutoff cutoff
(5) (6) (1) (2) (3) (4)
 
Note:  The table presents regressions of schools’ vulnerability index values (measured at the secondary 
level) on a dummy for whether their SNED index was greater than or equal to the cutoff score in their 
respective homogeneous group.  Panels A-B and C-D refer to the 2- and 4-year samples, respectively (See 
Section IV.D and Table 1).  
***,
**, and 
* denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. 
1 For the 4-year sample, the table excludes the 2006 SNED wave, since outcomes are not available.  In 
addition, both samples treat the 2007 observations as if they had been taken in 2008—see Section IV.D. 
 
 